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Abstract
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency
and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use nonbinding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders
decide simultaneously whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict. A simple
theoretical analysis suggests that Proposers should never offer side-payments because
Responders should always accept them and then still choose to enter conflict; however, our
experiment reveals that some individuals use this non-binding mechanism to avoid conflict.
Moreover, when subjects earn their roles (Proposer or Responder), conflicts are 44% more likely
to be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned entitlements impact behavior in
three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position persistently make larger
offers; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict, but (3) Proposers whose offers do
not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully with greater conflict expenditure. Hence, with
earned rights, the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency are offset by higher
conflict intensity. This result differs from previous experimental evidence from ultimatum games
in which earned entitlements tend to encourage agreement and increase welfare; thus, our
findings highlight the important consequences of endogenizing the costs of conflict. Our analysis
suggests that earned entitlements alter behavior by influencing the beliefs of Proposers about the
willingness of Responders to accept a peaceful resolution. As a result, these Proposers make
persistent high offers, and when their beliefs are disappointed by a Responder’s decision to
accept a side-payment and still enter conflict, they retaliate.
JEL Classifications: C72, C91, D72
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Introduction

When you reap the harvest of your land, do not reap to the very edges of your
field or gather the gleanings of your harvest. Do not go over your vineyard a
second time or pick up the grapes that have fallen. Leave them for the poor and
the alien. (Leviticus 19:9-10)
The God of the Old Testament instructed his followers to leave some of the fruits of their
harvest in their fields, un-harvested. An economist might assume merely that God understood the
Law of Diminishing Returns and taught his followers accordingly. But to ignore the exhortation
to leave something behind for the poor and alien is to miss a potentially rich historical and
economic point. Why, beyond the diminishing returns to labor, might one want to leave unpicked
fruit on a vine?
The property rights to the goods are clearly delineated in this story. No indication is given
that the people for whom the gleanings are to be left have any claim to the harvest through the
application of their labor or capital to the production process. Furthermore, that one indirect
object of the exhortation is “the alien” (that is, foreigners and persons unknown) rules out the
folk theorem and the shadow of the future as explanations. One way to reconcile these issues,
then, is to postulate altruistic intentions or social preferences. However, this explanation ignores
a few historical facts which, taken together, suggest an altogether different interpretation.
During the historical era in which this text was written, the world of the Jewish people
was in upheaval. Ravaged by war, famine, and forced migrations in the previous century, the
people had begun to resettle, but for each family that settled a piece of land, there was another
traveling in search of a place of its own.1 The poor wanderer who hungrily stumbled upon a
thriving farm would have been tempted to steal from the farm for sustenance. Violence to one’s
property likely would have been met with violence, and costly conflict ensued. In this context,
the idea of leaving unpicked fruit for “the poor and alien” begins to look more strategic and less

1

Whether one accepts the timeline laid out in the text of the Old Testament itself (Genesis 12:4-9, 26:12-22; Exodus
14:5-9; Joshua 13:1-32) or one follows the standard view of Biblical historians who argue that Leviticus was first
put to paper in the wake of the Babylonian Captivity c. 500 BCE (Warington, 1873; Harris, 1985), this narrative can
be demonstrated to reflect the experience of the Jewish people.

1

altruistic. The leftover goods take on the characteristics of a side-payment, offered by the farmer
to ward off predation.2
In societies without strong institutional structures, the prospect of resource conflict is
similarly ubiquitous. To reduce the risk of conflict, groups often uphold informal norms of
reciprocal gift-giving, tolerated theft, and sharing (see e.g., Gurven, 2004; Henrich et al., 2005;
Schechter, 2007). However, any (implicit or explicit) promises to avoid conflict made in the
context of an informal norm are unenforceable. Thus, when one party offers resources to another
in order to deter predation, there is always the risk that the payment is accepted and then conflict
occurs anyway. A similar dynamic is at play in international politics. For example, aid may be
offered to some nations under the condition that the leaders from aid-receiving nations adopt
certain policies, but since such promises are unenforceable, a nation may accept aid and
nevertheless fail to change policy (Kanbur, 2006; Temple, 2010). In the context of the Cold War,
many aid payments were explicitly made with the goal of avoiding conflict – aid was offered to
prevent nations from joining “the other side”. Such aid was clearly not always effective.
Because of the incentive problems discussed above, most models of conflict resolution
rely on the ability of parties to commit to a plan of action. For example, if contracts are
enforceable, then binding, strategy-contingent transfer payments are sufficient to obviate costly
conflicts in both theory and practice (Anbarci et al., 2002; Muthoo, 2004; Garfinkel &
Skaperdas, 2007; Esteban & Sakovics, 2008; Kimbrough & Sheremeta, 2013).3 Nevertheless, in
many conflicts, parties often incur large costs despite the possibility of Pareto improving
resolutions. Experimental evidence suggests that individuals are prone to reject Pareto improving
settlements when the proposed outcome is perceived as unfavorable (or unfair)4 and some
individuals may simply enjoy fighting (or winning)5. On the other hand, there is some evidence
that even in the absence of enforceable contracts, individuals can achieve Pareto improvements
by employing conventions, reputation-based mechanisms, reciprocity, and cheap talk,
particularly in the context of the informal norms mentioned above.6 However, it is unclear under
2

Jones (1994) offers a similar argument for the emergence of human food sharing in general.
For a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature see Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2012) and for the
experimental literature see Dechenaux et al. (2012).
4
See Hoffman & Spitzer (1985), Guth & Tietz (1990) and Henrich et al. (2001) for experimental evidence.
5
Sheremeta (2010a, 2010b) find that subjects expend resources seeking a prize worth nothing.
6
Maynard Smith & Parker (1976) and Maynard Smith (1982) first demonstrated that employing conventions is an
evolutionarily stable strategy in Hawk-Dove games. Similar conventions can emerge to solve numerous other
coordination problems (Young, 1993; Sugden, 2005). Hafer (2006) shows that in a repeated conflict over a resource
3
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what circumstances non-binding mechanisms can be employed to avert conflict. Our research is
designed to help resolve this question in a controlled laboratory setting that captures many of the
important features of conflicts outside the lab while facilitating causal inference. In that light, we
view laboratory studies as an important complement to field studies (Imai et al., 2011).
Our experiment is built on a two-stage conflict game with side-payment offers
(Kimbrough & Sheremeta, 2013). In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders decide
whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict over a valuable resource.
Specifically, the game consists of two stages. In the bargaining stage, the Proposer offers a sidepayment to the Responder in an attempt to keep the resource and to avoid participation in a
lottery contest in the conflict stage. After receiving the offer from the Proposer, the Responder
decides whether to accept the offer and also whether to enter the conflict. Hence, the Responder
may accept the offer and nevertheless enter the conflict. If the Responder accepts the offer, the
Responder’s payoff increases by the amount of the offer and the Proposer’s payoff decreases by
the same amount. However, if the Responder rejects the offer (or accepts the offer and still enters
the conflict), both players advance to the conflict stage, in which they compete for the resource
in a lottery contest. Since the side-payment contract is not enforceable, the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium is for the Proposer to make a zero side-payment offer and for the Responder to
accept any offer and enter the conflict anyway.
Previous experimental evidence from Kimbrough & Sheremeta (2013) indicates that
some Proposers make large offers and some Responders accept those offers and choose not to
enter conflict, even in anonymous, one-shot interactions. This suggests a potentially valuable
role for non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms; and our paper is motivated by the
observation that the likelihood of conflict resolution may be even higher if entitlements (or
property rights) to the resource are clearly assigned ex ante. Thus, we employ two treatments to
explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in the
simple conflict game described above. In the Random treatment, we model a situation in which
one party has come to possess a valuable resource by chance, and in the Earned treatment, we

with incomplete information, possession is a signal of success in previous conflicts and can establish expectations
among potential contestants that support equilibria in which no conflict occurs. Muthoo (2004) shows how transfers
can reduce conflict in repeated games of production and appropriation. Tingley & Walter (2011) show how cheap
talk deterrence efforts impact conflict rates in an entry game.
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model a situation closer to that described in the biblical passage above in which one party has
earned the resource.
It is well documented in experimental literature that property rights (entitlements)
significantly affect behavior in ultimatum, dictator, and team production bargaining games
(Hoffman et al., 1994, 1998; Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008; Gachter & Riedl,
2005), and there is also anthropological evidence that people treat windfall gains differently than
hard-earned gains; see e.g., Henrich et al. (2005) and associated commentary. In general,
inducing a property right leads to more self-regarding behavior on the behalf of the right-holder
and more acceptance of such behavior by others without rights. To see how a perceived property
right could impact bargaining in a two-stage conflict game, suppose that a contested resource is
first discovered by one individual, call him the resident (i.e., the Proposer), and only later
contested by another, the contestant (i.e., the Responder). If the contestant believes that the
resident has a property right to the resource, then she may be more likely to accept a contractual
resolution, and knowing this, the resident may be more willing to offer a side-payment.7 This is
the effect that has been observed in previous work on entitlements in bargaining games, but our
design introduces a second dimension on which property rights may have an impact.
Specifically, previous experiments have employed exogenous disagreement payoffs, but in the
conflict game, rent dissipation is endogenous, and thus the impact of earned entitlements may
also be observed in conflict expenditures. For example, if first possession creates an endowment
effect in the resident, say, by reference to some social convention (finders keepers), then all else
equal, the resident may be willing to fight harder than the contestant for the resource.8
While the examples that we considered so far emphasize the impact of entitlements on
interpersonal conflict, it should be clear that the underlying ideas are applicable to any level of
organization. For example, Butler & Gates (2012) model conflict over rangeland in Africa and
show how asymmetric entitlements can actually lead to conflict if one side is persistently
disadvantaged.9 More generally, territorial disputes between nations have many of the same
7

Empirical studies of animal territoriality frequently identify a ‘residency effect’; that is, first possessors
disproportionately win resource contests (Haley, 1994; Alcock & Bailey, 1997; Kemp & Wiklund, 2004), and a
recent experiment by DeScioli and Wilson (2011) documents the residency effect in human subjects.
8
Gintis (2007) exploits the logic of Parker’s (1974) “fighting assessment” to show how such a tendency could
describe the origin of property rights in wars of attrition: if the contestant knows that the resident will be willing to
expend more effort on defense than she will on offense, then she should respond by choosing not to fight.
9
The intuition is similar to that in Grafen (1987), who shows that when one side is persistently in disadvantageous
position, “desperado” behavior may be optimal.
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features as those between individuals and smaller groups, and perceptions about who is entitled
to a particular area may shape the nature and likelihood of conflict. The results of our experiment
show that this is exactly the case.
We find that when subjects earn their rights to be either Proposer or Responder, conflicts
are 44% more likely to be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned rights impact
behavior in three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position persistently make
larger offers; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict, but (3) Proposers whose
offers do not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully and exhibit greater conflict
expenditure. Hence, with earned rights, the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency
are offset by higher conflict intensity.
Our findings are of interest both to field researchers and to those studying conflict and
conflict resolution inside the lab. Outside the lab, conflicting perceptions of entitlement are often
essential components of conflict (Gurven, 2004; Schechter, 2007), and our experiment provides
clear casual evidence on how entitlements (earned versus randomly assigned) impact bargaining
and conflict. Our finding that the conflict avoidance benefits of earned rights are offset by
increased conflict intensity is of particular interest to researchers studying conflict and conflict
resolution in the laboratory (Linster et al., 2001; Arce et al., 2011; Tingley, 2011; Deck &
Sheremeta, 2012; Dechenaux et al., 2012). Most previous studies of earned rights indicate that
they are successful at reducing the costs of conflict – e.g. in ultimatum games, increased
acceptance of offers is equivalent to reduced waste. Our results suggest that the impact of earned
rights may not be so sanguine, as conditional on conflict occurring, earned rights increase its
intensity. Our design allowed us to identify this effect by endogenizing the costs of conflict. In
the discussion, we argue that the impact of earned rights operates largely by changing the beliefs
of participants, and suggest directions for future research.

Experimental environment, design, predictions and procedures
Experimental environment and model predictions
Our experiment examines a two-player conflict game in which both players expend
resources competing for an indivisible resource that each value at v = 60. The game is divided
into two sequential stages: the bargaining stage and the conflict stage. In the bargaining stage,
the Proposer offers a side-payment s between 0 and 60 to the Responder in an attempt to avoid
5

participation in a rent-seeking lottery contest in the conflict stage. After receiving the sidepayment offer s from the Proposer, the Responder decides whether to accept the offer and also
whether to enter the conflict. Hence, the Responder may accept a side-payment s and
nevertheless enter the conflict. If the Responder accepts the offer and decides not to enter the
conflict, the game ends with the Responder receiving a payoff of s and the Proposer receiving a
payoff of v – s, and neither player enter the conflict stage. In such a case, the surplus split
between the two players is Π = s + v – s = v = 60. However, if the Responder rejects the offer
(or accepts the offer and still enters the conflict), both players advance to the conflict stage, in
which, according to our instructions, the Responder “may attempt to take” the prize from the
Proposer.
In the conflict stage, the Proposer and the Responder partake in the rent-seeking lottery
contest due to Tullock (1980) between two symmetric players (i.e., player 1 and player 2). Both
players expend costly resources e1 and e2 to increase their probabilities of winning the prize. A
player i‘s probability of winning is defined by a lottery contest success function, i.e., pi(e1, e2) =
ei/(e1 + e2). The expected payoff for a risk-neutral player i is E(πi) = pi(e1, e2)v – ei. By
differentiating E(πi) with respect to ei and solving the best response functions simultaneously, we
obtain unique Nash equilibrium expenditure levels e1* = e2* = v/4 = 15. Given the equilibrium
expenditures, the expected payoffs of both players are E(π1*) = E(π2*) = v/4 = 15. Hence, the
equilibrium prediction for the Tullock contest, independent of the bargaining stage, is that both
players will expend 15 and each will receive on average a payoff of 15. Given that the game
proceeds to the conflict stage, the equilibrium surplus split between the two players is Π* =
E(π1*) + E(π2*) = v/2 = 30.
Going back to the bargaining stage, since the side-payment offer is non-binding, the
Responder has a dominant strategy to always accept the side-payment s and to enter the conflict
stage, where she earns an additional expected payoff of 15 (this is because the prize is indivisible
and s is withdrawn from the Proposer’s initial endowment). Thus, knowing that the Responder
cannot be dissuaded from conflict in the bargaining stage, the Proposer should never offer a sidepayment, i.e., s* = 0, and the game should always reach the conflict stage. Hence, the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium is for the Proposer to offer a side-payment of zero and for the
Responder to accept all the offers and always enter the conflict.

6

Experimental design
Building on this environment, we employ a between-subjects experimental design to
explore the impact of earned rights on the frequency and intensity of conflict. Our treatments
vary whether a subject’s assignment to the role of Proposer is Earned or Random. In the Earned
treatment, after reading the instructions, all subjects took a ten-question, general knowledge quiz.
Subjects were ranked by the number of questions they answered correctly and ties were broken
by how quickly the answers were submitted. The subjects knew that they would be assigned their
roles on the basis of their performance on the quiz. They were also told that the top performers
on the quiz had “earned the right to be Proposers” and that the bottom half were assigned to be
Responders. While the instructions in all treatments indicated that Proposers had prior claims to
the resource – recall the statement that Responders “may attempt to take” the resource from
Proposers – in the Earned treatment we allocate these prior claims by relative performance on
the quiz rather than randomly, as in the other treatments. The outline of the experimental design
and theoretical predictions are shown in Table 1.

The hypothesized effects of earned rights
Note that the Earned treatment changes neither the structure of the game nor the expected
payoffs relative to the Random treatment, so the theoretical predictions under the standard
money-maximizing model do not change. Nevertheless, it has been well documented in
experimental literature that when subjects earn their roles, their behavior changes (Hoffman et
al., 1994, 1998; Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008; Gachter & Riedl, 2005). Based on
previous findings, we suggest several hypotheses as to the impact of earned rights on the
frequency and intensity of conflicts.
In general, we argue that when subjects earn their roles and the initial allocation of
resources clearly assigns first-mover rights to one individual, cooperation will be easier because
subjects’ expectations will be aligned. Specifically, we expect that earned rights will decrease
conflict entry by Responders because Responders will be more inclined to respect the rights of
Proposers who make positive offers (Gachter & Riedl, 2005).

Hypothesis 1: Earned rights decrease the rate of conflict entry by Responders, controlling for the
amount offered.
7

The first hypothesis suggests that ceteris paribus, earned rights should decrease the
frequency of conflicts and increase the probability of conflict resolution. We emphasize that this
result should be stated conditionally on the offer amount, since as we discuss below, there are ex
ante plausible arguments that earned rights will move offers in either direction. Nevertheless, to
the extent that Responders’ respect the earned rights of Proposers, then an identical offer should
be more likely to be accepted in the Earned than in the Random treatment. At the same time,
earned rights may also lead to heavier fighting by Proposers because rebuffed attempts at
cooperation can lead to retaliation. This can also be interpreted as earned rights producing an
endowment effect (Gintis, 2007).

Hypothesis 2: Conditional on conflict, earned rights increase conflict expenditures by Proposers.

Thus, we hypothesize that earned rights will decrease the frequency of conflicts,
conditional on offer amounts, and increase the probability of conflict resolution (Hypothesis 1).
However, if and when conflict ensues, we expect Proposers to react spitefully because they will
believe that their property right is being disrespected (Hypothesis 2).
Finally, the expected effect of earned rights on offers is indeterminate because there are
two potential effects. First, those subjects who would already seek to cooperate by making
positive offers when rights are randomly assigned may decrease their offers if they believe they
have earned the right to a larger share of the surplus (Hoffman et al., 1994). On the other hand,
some Proposers who would not make positive offers if rights were randomly assigned may now
choose to offer positive amounts because they believe that a sufficient offer will induce nonentry, and this may increase offers on average.10 Since both of these interpretations are
intuitively plausible and we have no ex ante criteria for distinguishing them, we do not state a
formal hypothesis about the impact of earned rights on offers. We simply note that behavior
would in either case be jointly determined by the influence of earned rights on the beliefs of
participants. We return to this idea later when we discuss the prospects for future research on this
topic.

10

Since we employ a between-subjects design, we do not observe the impact of earned rights within-subject.
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Procedures
To test these hypotheses we ran three experimental sessions of each treatment with 12
subjects per session. Each session consisted of 30 periods of a single treatment in which subjects
were randomly and anonymously re-matched in each period. Subjects were assigned the role of
either Proposer or Responder (randomly in the Random treatment and earned through quiz
competition in the Earned treatment), and they persisted in that role throughout. At the end of
each experimental session, subjects completed a brief demographic survey. To reinforce the oneshot incentives of the game, subjects knew beforehand that we would select five of the 30
periods for payment using a bingo cage; subjects’ earnings from these five periods were added to
or subtracted from a participation fee of $20. We converted endowments and earnings to USD at
a rate of 30 = $1 and subjects were paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment. Sessions
lasted one hour each.
Subjects were recruited at random from the undergraduate student body of Chapman
University. Subjects sat at, and interacted via, visually isolated computer terminals, and
instructions were read aloud by the experimenter as subjects followed along on paper. Subjects
received their earnings in cash privately at the end of each session. The average experimental
earnings, including the $20 participation fee, were $22.6, ranging from a low of $16.0 to a high
of $28.3. No subject participated more than once, and no subject had prior experience with a
similar experimental environment. Instructions for the Earned treatment are included in the
Appendix. Instructions for the other treatments and the quiz are available from the authors upon
request.

Results
Comparisons to the theory
Table 2 displays summary statistics for our treatments. Theory predicts a total surplus of
30 in both the Random and Earned treatments (see Table 1). However, the data from the
experiment indicate that in the Random and Earned treatments, the average surpluses of 20.3 and
18.4 are significantly lower than the theoretical prediction of 30.

Finding 1: Surplus in both treatments is smaller than predicted.

9

To support these conclusions we estimated simple panel regressions separately for each
treatment, where the dependent variable is the surplus (payoff) and the independent variables are
a constant and a period trend. The models included a random effects error structure, with the
individual subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by individual
subjects. The standard errors were clustered at the session level, to control for the fact that
multiple subjects repeatedly interacted with each other in a given session. Based on Wald tests
conducted on estimates of each model, we found that surplus in all treatments is significantly
lower than predicted (p < 0.01).
Furthermore, much of the predicted surplus is lost due to substantial overinvestment in
conflict relative to the predictions (see Figures 1a and 1b). Additional panel regressions for each
treatment where conflict expenditure is the dependent variable and the independent variables are
a constant, a dummy variable indicating whether the subject was a Responder, and a period trend
indicate that these differences are statistically significant. As before, we include a random effects
error structure by subject to account for multiple observations, and we cluster standard errors by
session. Wald tests confirm that expenditures are greater than the predicted value of 15 (p <
0.01), and the coefficient on the Responder dummy is positive but insignificant for all
treatments.
However, the welfare losses due to over-dissipation are actually understated by the fact
that some pairs in both the Random and Earned treatments are able to use side-payment offers to
avoid conflict – with probabilities 0.16 and 0.23, respectively. Figures 2a and 2b display
histograms of side-payment offers for each treatment, and we confirm that offers are also
significantly larger than predicted by the theory with additional random-effects panel regressions
for each treatment where the Proposer’s side-payment offer is the dependent variable and the
independent variables are a constant and a period trend. We cluster standard errors by session,
and Wald tests confirm that offers are greater than the predicted amount of 0 in both the Random
and Earned treatments (p < 0.01).
Overall, these results are consistent with the findings of other studies on contests and
conflict resolution (for a review see Dechenaux et al., 2012). Specifically, the findings that
subjects sometimes use non-binding side-payment offers to successfully resolve conflicts (16%
in Random and 23% in Earned), replicate the findings of Kimbrough & Sheremeta (2013), who
report a conflict resolution rate of 14%. The finding that subjects overinvest in conflict (modeled
10

as a lottery contest) replicates the findings of a large experimental literature on rent-seeking
(Davis & Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Anderson & Stafford, 2003; Sheremeta, 2010a,
2010b, 2011; Sheremeta & Zhang, 2010; Chowdhury et al., 2012; Mago, Samek & Sheremeta,
2013; Mago, Sheremeta & Yates, 2013).
These facts taken together indicate that our data replicate the patterns of deviation from
the theory observed in other studies, so now we turn our focus to the hypothesized effects of
earned rights.

Earned rights
First we examine whether the Earned treatment yields a significant increase in the
probability of avoiding conflict. Recall, Hypothesis 1 states that earned rights should decrease
entry by Responders and increase the probability of conflict resolution. Table 2 provides support
for Hypothesis 1, indicating that conflict in the Earned treatment is resolved with significantly
higher probability than in the Random treatment (probability of 0.23 versus 0.16), leading to
44% increase in the conflict resolution rate in the Earned case.

Finding 2: Earned rights increase the probability of conflict resolution because Proposers make
persistent and significantly larger offers in the Earned treatment.

Table 3 displays the probability of conflict resolution by treatment, conditional on the
size of the side-payment offer. For offers in the intervals [0, 15], (15, 30], and (30, 60], the
probability of avoiding conflict is increasing for both treatments, but the probability is
consistently higher for the Earned treatment. This finding and a significant and negative effect of
offer size on conflict probability are supported by regression analysis.
Specifically, as reported in Table 4, we estimate a linear probability model where the
dependent variable Enter is one or zero indicating whether the Responder chose to enter the
conflict stage. Restricting attention to non-zero offers, we estimate the impact of earned rights on
the probability of entry, controlling for a period trend, the amount of offer, and whether the offer
was accepted. We include random effects to account for multiple observations on each subject,
and we cluster standard errors by session. The effect of earned rights (Earned) on the probability
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of conflict (Enter) is negative and weakly significant (p = 0.09), and the effect of offer size
(Offer) is significant and negative (p < 0.01).
However, this regression underestimates the treatment effect because offers are
persistently higher in the Earned treatment. The mean offer in the Earned treatment is 15.8 while
it is only 12.3 in the Random treatment (Table 2). Figures 2a and 2b, displaying histograms of
bargaining stage offers in the Random and Earned treatments, indicate the increase in the
observed frequency of offers around 30 in the Earned treatment.
The effect of earned rights on offers is even more pronounced when we look at the
change in the distribution of offers over time. Figure 3 displays time series of the mean offer in
the Earned and Random treatments. In the first 10 periods, the mean offer of 18.7 in the Random
treatment is marginally higher than the mean offer of 17.5 in the Earned treatment. However, by
the final 10 periods, the mean offer in the Random treatment has fallen by 63% to 7.0, while the
mean offer in the Earned treatment has fallen only by 9% to 16.0.
Regression analysis, reported in Table 5, indicates a significant relative decline in offers
in the Random treatment. We estimate a panel regression with a random effects error structure to
account for multiple observations on each subject, and we cluster standard errors at the session
level. The dependent variable Offer is the amount of the side-payment offer, and the independent
variables are a constant, a period trend Period, an Earned treatment dummy variable, and a term
Period×Earned capturing the interaction of the period trend and the Earned rights dummy. The
coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant (p < 0.01) and the coefficient on
period alone is negative and significant (p < 0.01). A Wald test cannot reject the linear
hypothesis that the period trend Period and the Period×Earned interaction term sum to zero,
which suggests that offers decline over time only in the Random treatment (p = 0.13).
To understand the source of the treatment effect on offers, Figure 4 displays time series
of offers for each Proposer. In both the Random and Earned treatments, many subjects make
substantial offers in early periods, but in the Earned treatment, far fewer of those subjects
eventually reduce their offers to 0. The bold outlined panels in Figure 4 show subjects who made
cooperative offers in early periods and later reduced their offers. Eleven subjects in the Random
treatment offered less than 5 (on average) over the final 10 periods, while only five subjects do
the same in the Earned treatment. Hence, earned rights induce persistent attempts at cooperation,
which translate into a 44% increase in the probability of conflict resolution.
12

Despite the surplus gains from attempted cooperation and the resulting increase in the
probability of avoiding conflicts, our data indicate that earned rights had no significant effect on
total welfare11, in particular due to a reduction in Proposer payoffs (see Table 2).12 What explains
these apparently contradictory tendencies? Table 6 displays statistics on offers, rejections, and
conflicts in each treatment. To understand the source of the decrease in Proposers’ payoffs,
notice first that Proposers in the Earned treatment make non-zero offers 75% of the time versus
only 70% in the Random treatment. Furthermore, Responders reject a slightly larger percentage
of non-zero offers in the Random treatment, which allows Responders to retain more of the
surplus. This partly explains the decrease in Proposers payoffs, but both effects are welfare
neutral, given that side-payments merely transfer resources to the Responder. To understand why
the Earned treatment does not generate an increase in total surplus, we analyze the conflict
expenditures of each type in both treatments.

Finding 3: There is no significant effect of earned rights on total surplus because the increase in
the rate of conflict resolution is offset by higher conflict expenditures by those Proposers who
find themselves in a conflict after their offer is accepted.

According to Hypothesis 2, when conflict ensues, earned rights should increase contest
expenditures by Proposers, thereby reducing surplus. Table 7 displays average conflict
expenditure by treatment and subject type, depending on whether a positive offer was accepted
or rejected. In the Random treatment, non-zero accepted offers lead Proposers to reduce their
expenditures (either because the positive offer signals cooperative intentions or because they are
cutting their losses), but in the Earned treatment, when Responders accept positive offers and
still choose to enter the conflict, Proposers react spitefully, fighting just as hard as when their
offers are rejected.
These results receive statistical support (see Table 8) in additional random-effects panel
regressions, estimated separately for Proposers and Responders and restricted to observations in
11

We estimate simple panel regressions, with subject-specific random effects and standard errors clustered by
session where the dependent variable is surplus and the independent variables are a constant, a period trend, and an
Earned treatment dummy. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the Earned treatment has no effect (p > 0.7).
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We estimate additional random-effects panel regressions, with standard errors clustered by session, separately for
Proposers and Responders. The dependent variable is individual payoff and the independent variables are a constant,
a period trend, and an Earned treatment dummy. The effect of earned rights is negative and (weakly) significant
only for Proposers in the Earned treatment (p = 0.06).
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which Proposers made non-zero offers. The dependent variable Expenditure is conflict
expenditure and the independent variables are a constant, a period trend Period, the sidepayment Offer, an Earned treatment dummy, a binary variable Accept indicating whether the
offer was accepted, and an interaction term Earned×Accept of the treatment dummy and whether
the offer was accepted. We cluster standard errors by session. For Proposers, the coefficient on
Accept is significant and negative (p < 0.02), which indicates that Proposers in the Random
treatment invest less when their offers are accepted. On the other hand, the coefficient on the
interaction term Earned×Accept is significant and positive (p < 0.02), and a Wald test cannot
reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients sum to zero (p = 0.77). This indicates that in the
Earned treatment Proposers fight by expending resources just as hard when their offer is
accepted as when it is rejected, thus accounting for the diminished surplus. All other coefficients
except the constant are insignificant (p > 0.5).13 In the estimated equation for Responders, all
coefficients are insignificant (p > 0.15).

Finding 4: Controlling for offer size, Proposers in the Earned treatment expend more resources
in conflict when their offers are accepted than Proposers in the Random treatment.

Taken together, this evidence explains why earned rights do not change the aggregate
surplus, despite decreasing the probability of conflict. According to these findings, earned rights
impact behavior in three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position
persistently offer larger side-payments; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict;
but (3) Earned Proposers whose offers do not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully and
spend just as much in conflict as when offers are rejected (Finding 3). Hence, with earned rights,
the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency are offset by greater conflict intensity,
resulting in unchanged surplus.

Discussion
Our experiment generates three novel stylized facts that leave us with three motivational
puzzles. First, we would like to be able to explain why earned rights induce Proposers to make
13

An alternative specification excluding the interaction term shows no effect of accepting the offer and instead gives
a positive and weakly significant coefficient on the Earned treatment dummy (p = 0.09), which imperfectly captures
the same effect.

14

persistent, out-of-equilibrium, large offers. Second, we want to understand why these offers are
sometimes successful in eliminating conflict. Finally, we want to understand why conflict
becomes more costly with earned entitlements.
In the end, though our experiment makes clear the behavioral impact of earned rights in a
conflict setting, the underlying motivational impacts of earned rights are complex. We would
argue that whether earned rights encourage cooperation or conflict depends on how they alter the
beliefs of participants – if earned rights are salient and induce the belief that their holder has
legitimately acquired a property right, then they may reduce the likelihood of conflict, as indeed
we observe. But if only one party adopts this belief, then the ensuing conflicts may be more
intense, as we also observe. In the study reported here, the positive and negative effects actually
balance out one another, so that there is no change in total social welfare.
However, in our design, we do not directly observe or measure beliefs, so we cannot say
with certainty that changes in beliefs are the source of observed changes in behavior. This is an
important direction for future research. Perhaps an experiment that jointly elicits beliefs and
actions in our setting would be able to identify the motivations of participants more directly. In
particular such a design would be valuable for understanding the observed effect of earned rights
on Proposer’s offers. As we noted in the hypotheses section, this effect could have gone in either
direction. If Proposers believed (a) that they had earned the prize and (b) that Responders
believed (a), then we might have expected offers to decline. Those readers familiar with the
ultimatum game literature may find this intuition appealing, as it is consistent with evidence
there that earned rights increase the selfishness of Proposers. Instead, we observe persistent
higher offers among these Proposers, suggesting perhaps that they were attempting to persuade
Responders to adopt their beliefs. In this sense, offers can be viewed as a kind of “expensive
talk”14 meant to convey information about the Proposer’s beliefs; indeed, why would a Proposer
make a positive offer if he believed that no such offer could ever preclude conflict? When
coupled with the fact that we observe higher conflict expenditures, conditional on entry, this
interpretation seems plausible, as it seems that slighted Proposers react spitefully to entry by
Responders. We hope that these issues will provide fruitful directions for future research.
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In contrast to “cheap talk”.
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Conclusion
In many contexts, individuals and groups attempt to employ non-binding mechanisms to
resolve costly conflicts. As our biblical example suggests, the threat of resource conflict has
motivated attempts to implement such mechanisms, despite issues of enforceability, far into
recorded history, and recent research suggests that similar mechanisms are at work in both small
and large scales even today (e.g., Gurven, 2004; Kanbur, 2006; Schechter, 2007; Temple, 2010).
However, the lack of naturally occurring data prevents us from answering exactly how nonbinding mechanisms resolve conflicts. Controlled laboratory experiments offer a useful
methodology for studying conflict and conflict resolution (Arce et al., 2011; Imai et al., 2011;
Dechenaux et al., 2012). Here, we use an experiment to explore how the effectiveness of nonbinding conflict resolution mechanisms depends on earned entitlements. In particular, we
examine how earned rights to a valuable resource impact the following variables: (1) the
willingness to offer payments intended to obviate resource conflict, (2) the willingness to accept
such payments and voluntarily forgo conflict, and (3) the costs of conflicts that result from failed
attempts at cooperation.
Previous literature documents that earned entitlements frequently increase the extent to
which behavior approximates Nash play in bargaining games. When subjects observe that a
decision maker has earned the right to an assigned role (e.g., the Proposer), the decision maker
often behaves more selfishly and others are more likely to accept decisions that favor the rightholder (e.g., by accepting lower offers in ultimatum games, see Hoffman et al., 1994). However,
in these papers, the disagreement payoff is exogenous and subjects whose offers are rejected
have no opportunity to impact the payoffs of their counterpart after bargaining. Here we
endogenize the disagreement payoff in the conflict stage, which allows us to identify both the
gains from bargained conflict resolution and the costs of conflict escalation after bargaining fails.
We find that when Proposers earn the right to make side-payment offers, it creates a
sense of entitlement to a share of the prize. Proposers respond by offering more and persisting in
making high offers over time. These offers increase the rate of conflict resolution, but this does
not improve welfare. When Proposers who earned their role observe their counterparts accepting
transfer payments and nevertheless choosing to enter the conflict, they increase the intensity of
conflict, offsetting the gains from higher conflict avoidance.
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Thus, while it would appear that there is some role for non-binding mechanisms to reduce
the frequency of conflict, it is important to recognize that the effectiveness of such mechanisms
is influenced in two countervailing ways by the presence of earned entitlements. In particular,
our method of endogenizing the costs of conflict revealed a negative impact of entitlements that
had not been measured in previous research. In any application, the relative magnitudes of the
observed effects are likely to depend on both the perceived strength of the entitlements and the
costs and benefits of conflict, and for all these reasons, we would urge caution in extrapolating
from the success of earned entitlements in encouraging cooperation in previous work.

Replication data
All analyses were conducted using Stata 12 and R (R Core Team 2013). The dataset,
replication Stata and R files and an output log for the empirical analysis can be found at
http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.
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Table 1: Experimental design and theoretical predictions
Treatment
Player
Random Earned
Side-payment offer, s*
Proposer
0
0
Probability of conflict resolution
Responder
0.00
0.00
Proposer
15
15
Equilibrium expenditure, e*
Responder
15
15
Proposer
15
15
Expected payoff, E(*)
Responder
15
15
Available surplus, v
60
60
*
Equilibrium surplus, 
30
30

Table 2: Average summary statistics by treatment
Treatment
Player
Random
Earned
Side-payment offer, s
Proposer
12.3 (13.2)*
15.8 (14.1)*
Probability of conflict resolution
Responder
0.16*
0.23*
Proposer
23.3 (12.7)*
26.9 (10.9)*
Average expenditure, e
Responder
23.9 (12.8)*
27.3 (12.3)*
Proposer
5.1 (33.1)*
1.9 (34.1)*
Average payoff, 
Responder
15.2 (30.1)
16.5 (29.2)
Total surplus, 
20.6*
18.4*
Standard deviations in parentheses. * Indicates that the data are statistically significantly
different from the equilibrium of the model with p < 0.01 (Wald tests based on estimates
computed separately for each treatment and each variable of interest with subject- or pairspecific random effects and standard errors clustered at the session level).

21

Table 3: Probability of conflict resolution conditional on the side-payment offer
Treatment
Offer
Random Earned
0 ≤ s ≤ 15
0.09
0.06
15 < s ≤ 30
0.24
0.36
30 < s ≤ 60
0.48
0.64

Table 4: Linear probability estimates of conflict entry, non-zero offers
Enter
Offer
-0.014**
(0.003)
Earned
-0.052†
(0.031)
Accept
-0.012
(0.092)
Period
-0.003*
(0.001)
Constant
1.103**
(0.082)
Observations
781
R Sq.
0.169
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Estimates of proposer’s offers
Offer
Period
-0.495**
(0.089)
Earned
-2.589
(4.065)
Period×Earned
0.391**
(0.113)
Constant
19.974**
(1.195)
Observations
1080
R Sq.
0.0664
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table 6: Number of offers, rejections and conflicts
Treatment
Random Earned
Total # of offers
540
540
# of non-zero offers
377
404
(Prob = non-zero/total)
(0.70)
(0.75)
# of rejections
199
169
(Prob = rejections/total)
(0.37)
(0.31)
# of non-zero rejections
70
70
(Prob = rejections/non-zero)
(0.19)
(0.17)
# of conflicts avoided
89
125
(Prob = avoided/total)
(0.16)
(0.23)
Probabilities and conditional probabilities in parentheses.
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Table 7: Mean non-zero offers and expenditures by treatment
Treatment
Random
Earned
Decision Player
Offer > 0 Expenditure
Offer > 0
Expenditure
Proposer
16.9 (12)
20.9 (12.4)
20.9 (11.4)
28.2 (11.6)
Accept
Responder
16.9 (12)
22.7 (12.7)
20.9 (11.4)
27.4 (13.3)
Proposer
9.6 (9.7)
26.8 (11.4)
8.9 (8.5)
27.8 (9.9)
Reject
Responder
9.6 (9.7)
26.8 (12.1)
8.9 (8.5)
28.6 (9.8)
Standard deviation in parentheses.

Table 8: Estimates of conflict expenditures by type
Expenditure
Proposer Responder
Offer
-0.024
0.097
(0.090)
(0.080)
Earned
1.879
3.559
(3.107)
(3.120)
Period
-0.078
-0.024
(0.155)
(0.109)
Accept
-3.812*
-1.626
(1.603)
(1.144)
Earned×Accept 4.213*
-0.197
(1.771)
(1.233)
Constant
27.118** 24.339**
(1.525)
(2.515)
Observations
588
588
R Sq.
0.0831
0.0397
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Appendix (for online publication only) – Instructions for the earned treatment
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. Various research agencies have
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make appropriate
decisions, you and the 11 other participants in this experiment can earn an appreciable amount of money, which will
be paid to you in CASH at the end of today’s experiment.
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _30_
francs to _1_ dollar. You have already received a $20.00 participation fee (this includes the $7 show up fee). The
experiment will consist of 30 periods and at the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods
for actual payment using a bingo cage. We will sum your total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a
U.S. dollar payment.
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s decisions. If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk,
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your
cooperation. The remainder of the instructions will describe the decisions you may face in each period.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 1
At the beginning of each period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 2
participants. Each randomly chosen pair will consist of one Proposer and one Responder.
The positions of Proposer and Responder will be determined by your scores on a quiz before the first
period of the experiment. Each of you will be asked the same set of 10 questions. Your quiz score is the number of
questions you answered correctly. Quiz scores will be ranked from highest to lowest and ties are decided by giving a
higher ranking to the person who finishes the quiz in the shortest amount of time.
Once the complete rankings of participants are determined, you will enter your name, and the participants
will be divided into two groups, the Proposers and the Responders. The lower ranking half will be Responders for all
periods of the experiment. The higher-ranking half has earned the right to be Proposers. Your role will determine the
decisions that you make.
Once the roles have been assigned, an experimenter will direct you to another computer. The computer will
display in the middle of the screen which role you have been assigned.
The composition of your pair will be changed randomly every period. Each period will consist of two
stages. In Stage 1, you and the other participant in your group will bargain over a reward. The reward is worth 60
francs to you and the other participant in your group.
YOUR DECISION
In each period, the Proposer will be endowed with the 60 franc reward and will have an opportunity to
make an Offer to the Responder. The Proposer may offer any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. An
example of the Proposer’s decision screen is shown below.
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Once the Proposer has entered an offer and submitted that offer to the Responder, the Responder will
choose either to Accept or Reject the offer and also whether to enter Stage 2 or not. An example of the Responder’s
decision screen is shown below.

EARNINGS
If the Responder accepts the offer and decides not to enter stage 2, the Responder receives a payment equal
to the offer, and the Proposer receives the 60 franc reward minus the amount of the offer:
Proposer Earnings
= 60 – Offer
Responder Earnings
= Offer
If the Responder rejects the offer and decides not to enter stage 2, the Responder receives a payment equal
to 0, and the Proposer receives the 60 franc reward:
Proposer Earnings
= 60
Responder Earnings
=0
If the Responder accepts the offer and decides to enter Stage 2, then the experiment moves to Stage 2 in
which the Responder may attempt to take the reward. In that case, the Responder receives a payment equal to the
earnings from Stage 2 plus the offer, and the Proposer receives the earnings from Stage 2 minus the offer:
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Proposer Earnings
= Earnings in Stage 2 – Offer
Responder Earnings
= Earnings in Stage 2 + Offer
If the Responder rejects the offer, then the experiment moves to Stage 2 in which the Responder may
attempt to take the reward. In that case, both participants will receive their earnings from decisions made in Stage 2:
Proposer Earnings
= Earnings in Stage 2
Responder Earnings
= Earnings in Stage 2
Note, if the Responder decides not to enter stage 2 (disregarding whether he accepts or rejects the offer)
then the period ends after stage 1. However, if the Responder decides to enter stage 2 (disregarding whether he
accepts or rejects the offer) both participants will enter stage 2.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 2
DECISION IN STAGE 2
In Stage 2, the Responder may attempt to take the reward from the Proposer. Each participant may bid for
the 60 franc reward. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. An example of your decision
screen is shown below.

EARNINGS IN STAGE 2
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. Regardless of
who receives the reward, all participants will have to pay their bids. Thus, your earnings in stage 2 will be calculated
in the following way:
If you receive the reward:
Earnings in Stage 2 = 60 – Your Bid
If you do not receive the reward:
Earnings in Stage 2 = 0 – Your Bid
Remember you have already received a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 600 francs). Depending on a
period, you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the experiment we will randomly select 5
out of 30 periods for actual payment. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S.
dollar payment. If the earnings are negative, we will subtract them from your participation fee. If the earnings are
positive, we will add them to your participation fee.
What Does my Bid Mean?
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participant in your
group bids, the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid you will receive one
lottery ticket. At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by
you and the other participant in the group. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the reward worth 60 francs. Thus,
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your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of francs you bid divided by the total number of francs
you and the other participant in your group bids.

If both participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two participants in the group.
Example of the Random Draw
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a random draw. If participant
1 bids 10 francs and participant 2 bids 20 francs, the computer assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1 and 20
lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 30 (10 + 20). As you can
see, participant 2 has higher chance of receiving the reward: 0.67 = 20/30. Participant 2 has 0.33 = 10/30 chance of
receiving the reward.
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw which will decide who
receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you
received the reward or not.
At the end of each period, the Proposer’s offer, whether the offer was accepted, whether the Responder
entered Stage 2, your bid, the other participant’s, whether you received the reward or not, and the earnings for the
period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record
your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. An example of the
outcome screen is shown below.

IMPORTANT NOTES
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. At the beginning of
each period you will be randomly re-grouped with one other participant to form a two-person group. You can never
guarantee yourself the reward. However, if you are the Proposer in stage 1, and the Responder decides not to enter
stage 2, you will receive the reward. Furthermore, if the experiment proceeds to stage 2 then by increasing your bid
in stage 2, you can increase your chance of receiving the reward. In stage 2, regardless of which participant receives
the reward, all participants must pay their bids.
Are there any questions?
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